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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1947-1948

TAXATION

As has long been the case, the Supreme Court reports contained the usual number of decisions on objections to tax rates
and similar problems, but practically all involved well-settled
principles. The case of Chicago & North Western Railway Company v. Drainage District No. 1,23 however, might be considered
to possess some interest. The district there concerned had levied
a drainage assessment and had, in due course, deposited the tax
list with the clerk as required by statute. 24 Notice was mailed
by the clerk to the taxpayer but not until more than two months
had elapsed after the date of filing and long after the ten-day
period fixed by law within which to appeal to the county court for
relief from the assessment. 25 The land owner did not appeal to
the county court but instead filed an independent suit in equity
to restrain the enforcement of the assessment, claiming the same
was illegal. A decree dismissing the suit was upheld on the ground
that the land owner had an adequate remedy at law by way of
objection to proceedings by the county collector brought to enforce the tax, particularly since the failure to appeal had in no
way made the tax levy res judicata for no jurisdiction had been
acquired. The case is remarkable only because of the intimation
therein, easing the effect heretofore given to the statute by prior
cases, 26 that the taxpayer cannot be precluded from a clear right
to litigate the validity of the assessment through any default of
the public official.
VIII. TORTS
Perhaps the most important case which developed in the field
of tort law during the past year presented the novel problem
as to the liability to be imposed on the owner of an automobile
23 398 111. 232, 75 N. E. (2d) 283 (1947).
24 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 42, § 103.
25 Ibid., § 110.

26 See Geitl v.. Com'rs of Drainage District No. 1, etc., 384 Ill. 499, 51 N. E.
(2d) 512 (1943), where appeal to the county court was denied because not filed
in the ten-day period, and Schwartz v. Com'rs of Big Lake Special Drainage Dist.,
307 Ill. 209, 138 N. E. 665 (1923).
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if he should leave the car unlocked with the key in the ignition,
in violation of a statute,' in case the car is stolen and, through
the negligence of the thief, becomes the cause of damage to the
property of another. According to the facts of that case, to-wit:
Ostergardv. Frisck,2 the defendant had parked his car on a city
street one morning, with doors unlocked and key in the ignition,
while in pursuit of his occupation. Subsequent events indicated
that a thief had stolen the car, had collided with a parked automobile belonging to the plaintiff at a point some six or more city
blocks away from the scene of the theft, and had then abandoned
the vehicle. Plaintiff did not allege, but for that matter the defendant did not deny, that the thief was fleeing from the scene
of the theft at the time the collision occurred. Upon a stipulation
as to the facts and upon a trial without a jury, judgment was
rendered for the plaintiff. The judgment was affirmed on appeal.
It is important to note, at the outset, that the Appellate
Court for the First District assumed that the thief was fleeing
from the scene of the crime at the time the accident happened
as this would seem to have considerable bearing on the defendant's liability. The precise question involved, however, was one
concerning the violation of a duty arising by virtue of statutory
enactment. Stated differently, could it be said that defendant
owed a duty to plaintiff and, if so, was the violation of the statute the proximate cause of the damage ? The defendant, of course,
relied primarily upon the contention that the act of the thief
was the independent, intervening, direct and proximate cause of
the harm inflicted. The Appellate Court, having examined the
decisions from other jurisdictions, including contradictory utterances by the courts of Massachusetts, inclined toward the minority
view on the subject as being best likely to serve the needs of
this state. In the judgment of the court, the purpose underlying
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95 1/, § 189(a), like § 92(a) in the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, provides: "No person driving or in charge of a motor
vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition and removing the key . . ." Violation of the statute is declared
to be a misdemeanor and subject to the penalty imposed by Section 234.
2 333 Ill. App. 359, 77 N. E. (2d) 537 (1948), noted in 36 Ill. B. J. 560. Niemeyer,
P. J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
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the enactment of the statute was to protect the public from just
the type of mischief that had happened, thereby placing upon the
owner of the vehicle the duty reasonably to foresee the possibility
of theft if he left the car unlocked and with the key in the ignition and thus preventing a break in the chain of causation.
Too lengthy a discussion of the case would not serve the
avowed purposes of this survey, but several points might well
be noted. In the first place, the case was tried without a jury.
A body of laymen might have dealt with the issue of foreseeability, one of the aspects of proximate causation, differently.
Secondly, plaintiff's complaint was based on damage to property.
The cases examined by the court all dealt with personal injury,
so the view might well arise that the decision represents an unwarranted extension of liability. Third, since the decision was
rendered, the Massachusetts court, confronted with a practically
identical case, 3 reached a decision for the defendant and overruled a prior decision which had apparently given the Illinois
4
court some guidance for its decision.
In another automobile case, that of Dyreson v. Hughes,5 a
minor girl sued the owner of the car for injuries she received
while riding as a guest therein. The complaint charged that the
steering gear of the car was defective in that it would unexpectedly cause the front wheels to lock; that defendant knew of
the defect; that he loaned the car to one Hughes, who invited
the plaintiff to ride in it on the day the accident happened; that
while Hughes was so driving the wheels locked, the car ran into
a telephone pole, and plaintiff suffered injury. There were four
counts in the complaint, the first two alleging negligence; the
latter two charging wilful and wanton misconduct. The defendant contended that the first two counts did not comply with the
3 Galbraith v. Levin, Mass. -, 81 N. E. (2d) 560 (1948). Plaintiff therein was
a pedestrian suing for personal injury.
4 Malloy v. Newman, 310 Mass. 269, 37 N. E. (2d) 1001 (1941).
The reason for
incongruity in the decisions from Massachusetts may lie in the peculiar interpretation given to the vehicle registration law of that state. The driver of an unregistered automobile is regarded as a trespasser on the highway.
5 333 Ill. App. 198, 76 N. E. (2d) 809 (1948).
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so-called "guest" statute,6 while as to the latter two he claimed
there was no direct connection between the parties to the suit
nor any facts showing wilful and wanton misconduct. The trial
court sustained defendant's motion to dismiss but, on appeal, the
Appellate Court reversed when it conceived the complaint to be
one stating a good cause of action.
It would appear from the opinion that the court considered
the statute applicable to the set of facts before it, one unlike
any prior case in Illinois, although it felt that the situation in
Bensman v. Reed 7 was similar. Again, the cases cited from other
jurisdictions were cases where a car in good working order was
entrusted to a person whom the owner knew, or should have
known, was inexperienced, incompetent or reckless. In the instant case, the driver was not alleged to be incapable, even though
a minor, although the car was delivered in poor working condition. The court nevertheless said: "Certainly, if the plaintiff can
prove that the defendant knew that the steering gear of his automobile was in such defective condition that it would lock, and
the driver of the same would be unable to control it on a public
highway, that this would be a reckless disregard of the rights
of other people either riding in the car, or other people on the
road, and he would be guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct in
so allowing the car to be driven upon the highway in such condition."" No point seems to have been made over the minority of
the plaintiff.9
Some negligence cases affecting railroads merit attention.
The evidence in Langston v. Chicago & North Western Railway
Company"° showed that the defendant had synchronized its own
warning signals with the operation of a stop and go light on a
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95/2, § 58a.
7299 Ill. App. 531, 20 N. E. (2d) 910 (1939); Liability therein was imposed on
a father who had loaned a competent automobile to his son, an incompetent driver
by reason of defective eyesight.
8 333 Ill. App. 198 at 206, 76 N. E. (2d) 809 at 812.
9 As to whether a minor can be the "guest" of the driver, see Fuller v. Thrun,
109 Ind. App. 407, 31 N. E. (2d) 670 (1941).
10398 Ill. 248, 75 N. E. (2d) 363 (1947), affirming 330 Ill. App. 260, 70 N. E. (2d)
852 (1947). Wilson, J., dissented to the denial of rehearing.
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nearby well-travelled parallel highway so that, when the highway signal for intersecting traffic was green, the motorist would
be assured that there would be no train approaching or standing upon the railroad crossing. At the time of the accident,
plaintiff had crossed the highway and proceeded toward the
railroad crossing by virtue of the invitation offered by a green
traffic signal. The night was foggy and the driver was unable
to see that a train was crossing the road. As a result, the car
was driven into the side of the train. The defendant had received judgment at the trial but this holding was reversed by
the Appellate Court. Upon further appeal, the Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed the latter decision. While it admitted that, as
a matter of law, the railroad company did not owe the travelling
public any duty to give warning of the presence of a train upon
the crossing, it held the rule did not apply to the case before itbecause the defendant, by synchronizing the operation of its own
warning system with the traffic lights, had invited the public to
cross the tracks in reliance thereon.
In another crossing case, that of Applegate v. Chicago (
North Western Railway Company," the decedent was killed when
he drove onto defendant's tracks shortly after a freight train
had cleared the crossing. There was evidence that the flasher
system had stopped signalling, luring the decedent onto the tracks
in time to be struck by one of defendant's streamlined trains
travelling at ninety miles per hour. Although the Appellate Court
agreed that the engineer of the passenger train had complied with
the statute concerning the giving of warning, 12 it declared that
the defendant had an additional common law duty to give suitable
and timely warning of the approach of the train and, since the
warning sound had been obscured by the noise of the freight train,
no effective warning had been given. As a consequence, the jury
could infer negligence on the defendant's part.
Still another suit, that of Carr v. Chicago & North Western
11334 Il. App. 141, 78 N. E. (2d) 793 (1948).
with approval.
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 114, § 59.

The court cited the preceding case
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Railway Company,13 involved the same railroad. The plaintiff's
truck had there been damaged when it had collided with a viaduct
beneath which there was insufficient overhead clearance room.
Plaintiff asserted a duty on the part of the defendant to maintain
safe crossings, that is, ones which would be adequate to meet present-day conditions. When affirming a judgment for the defendant,
the Apellate Court held that, despite a reduction in clearance from
original measurements by reason of a repaving of the road, there
was no burden on the defendant either to maintain the original
clearance, to raise the viaduct, or to post signs showing the extent
of the actual clearance.
Responsibility in tort on the part of a land owner became the
matter of concern in Jones v. 20 North Wacker Drive Building
Corporation14 where the plaintiff offered a novel argument in an
effort to have herself classed as an invitee. The defendant operated an opera house and, at the request of a certain drama league,
permitted persons appointed by the league to sell war bonds and
stamps in the lobby of the theater. A practice had developed
whereby the saleswomen were permitted to see the show, there
being no call for their services during the course of the performance. Plaintiff, one of the saleswomen, while looking for a seat
from which to view the performance, fell and suffered injury. She
was awarded judgment by the trial court but lost on appeal. In
an effort to impose an affirmative duty of care on the defendant,
plaintiff claimed to be an invitee. Recognizing that, under the
Illinois law, to be an invitee one must come upon the occupier's
land with his invitation, either express or implied, for a purpose
connected with his business, hence requires some showing of mutuality of interest, plaintiff argued that defendant had an interest in her endeavor to sell war bonds and stamps in aid of the
war effort for, if it had not provided facilities for the sale thereof,
a loss of patronage at the theater would have resulted. The court
answered this contention by pointing out that there was no evidence in the record to support the claim. Plaintiff, being merely
App. 567, 77 N. E. (2d) 857 (1948).
14332 Ill. App. 382, 75 N. E. (2d) 400 (1947), noted in 36 Il. B. J. 428.
13 333 I1.
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a licensee for the purpose of the sale of bonds and stamps, remained a licensee when she attempted to see the performance.
The extent of the duty of a land owner to trespassing children was re-examined by the Appellate Court in the case of Wood
v. Consumers Company.15 While not a case of first impression,
it is important and warrants attention. The facts, briefly stated,
were that the plaintiff's son, a boy of seven, while searching for
a place to skate and slide on a winter day, wandered onto certain
premises where the defendant mined, washed and graded sand and
gravel. In sliding down a sloping bank which led to a pool of
ice-covered water, the boy slid out on the ice and, as it gave way,
he drowned. When reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, the
court took occasion to review many prior Illinois cases bearing
on the point. As the pond was an ordinary body of water, it
was said not to come within the orbit of the attractive nuisance
doctrine for lack of any mechanical aspect. But, said the court,
even if the pond was an attractive nuisance, there still could be
no recovery because the pond itself was not visible from the
boy's home or from any public place where he had a right to be.
The remark was pure dictum, but there are few jurisdictions which
still impose such a requirement before permitting recovery in
attractive nuisance cases.
Dram shop cases, based on the Illinois statute, 6 often suggest new problems. The case of Economy Auto Insurance Company v. Brown17 posed the question as to whether or not the
right of action created by the statute could be utilized in favor
of an insurance carrier. The plaintiff, having paid claims against
its insured who had injured several people when driving his car
while intoxicated, claimed a right of action against the tavernkeeper who sold the liquor on the theory that, in settling such
claims, it had sustained a property damage within the purview of
the statute. The trial court sustained defendant's motion to
15 334 Ill. App. 530, 79 N. E. (2d) 826 (1948).

I1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 43, § 135.
17334 Ill. App. 579, 79 N. E. (2d) 854 (1948).
16

Leave to appeal has been denied.
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strike the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and
dismissed the suit. The judgment was affirmed when the Appellate Court declared that the plaintiff, to recover, had to allege
facts showing that the property loss was proximately caused by
the intoxication of the insured, thereby disposing of the plaintiff's contention that the doctrine of proximate causation had no
application to dram shop cases. As the test laid down required
that the injury be the natural and probable consequence of the intoxication, the court found that any obligation to pay under the
contract of insurance was not the natural and probable consequence thereof but rather the consequence of independent and
intervening factors, the intoxication merely furnishing, at most,
a condition for the operation of the contract. Furthermore, plaintiff had no right to subrogation inasmuch as the insured himself
could have had no rights against the defendant.
In another dram shop case, that of Howtett v. McGarvey,8
the plaintiff, mother of an eighteen year old girl who had been
killed by an intoxicated motorist, sued the tavern-keeper for damage to her "property."
The plaintiff did not claim any injury
to her "person" or to her "means of support" but contended
that the term "property," not being expressly defined in the
statute, should be interpreted as meaning anything which the
law has seen fit to recognize as being either the subject of a
property right or that which possesses a pecuniary interest. She
relied on interpretations provided by the courts in actions arising from wrongful death. The Appellate Court, however, reversing a judgment in her favor, held that, by reason of the strict
construction required for a statute in derogation of the common
law, the legislature did not intend to permit recovery for "pecuniary injuries," as is expressly permitted by the Injuries Act, 19
but rather contemplated injury to tangible real or personal
property.
There is not much occasion to refer to the case of Wendt v.
18334 Il. App. 512, 79 N. E. (2d) 864 (1948),
(2d) 708 (1949).
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 70, § 2.

affirmed in 402 Ill. 311, 83 N. E.
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Servite Fathers,20 which deals with the tort liability of a charitable
corporation for the negligence of its agents, for the case has already been noted elsewhere. 21 It might be said, however, that
the courts of this state seem to be reaching toward a more just
result in rejecting any thought of immunity where the charity
carries insurance. There may yet come a day when that entire
immunity will join other relics of the past in the museum of
the law.

20332 IU. App. 618, 76 N. E. (2d) 342 (1947),
Rawv 279.
21 See section on Business Organizations, ante.

noted in 26
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